Price Transmission and Marketing Margins in the Slovenian Beef and Pork Markets During Transition by Bojnec, Stefan
 
Price Transmission and Marketing Margins in the 
Slovenian Beef and Pork Markets 
During Transition 
                              by













Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 







Copyright 2002. All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice 






As in many other transition countries processing and marketing margins are also larger in the 
Slovenian meat market than respective margins in market economies. In addition, margin of 
the Slovenian pork chain is greater than in the beef chain. Its decline in the pork market 
indicates an adjustment to more competitive markets. Co-integration models are applied to 
estimate vertical price transmission and to examine margins and degree of competition in the 
meat marketing chains. Results indicate the existence of a long run equilibrium regarding 
vertical price transmission in the beef and pork sectors. Both the farm-gate beef and pork 
prices are identified as weakly exogenous in the long run. The structural tests imposing a 
homogeneity restriction suggest a mark-up long-run price strategy for beef and a competitive 
price strategy for pork after 1994 in the meat processing and marketing chains. 
 
JEL classification: D4; L1; C3; Q1 
Keywords: price transmission, marketing margin, co-integration, competition.  2  
Price transmission and marketing margins in the Slovenian beef and pork markets 
during transition 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades several studies have examined competitive models in factor and 
product markets, and how various shifts in demand and supply affect the farm-to-retail price 
ratio and price transmission. Most of these studies, however, have been conducted for OECD 
economies, and very rarely for new emerging market economies (e.g. Gardner and Brooks, 
1994; Wei, Guba and Burcroff, 1998). These studies largely rely on structural models to 
estimate price transmission (e.g. Hyde and Perloff, 1998). Initially, the econometric modelling 
work of price analysis in the food marketing chain largely followed Wolffram's (1971) 
studying irreversibility in supply, Houck's (1977) model specifications investigating 
asymmetric price transmission, and Gardner's (1975) theoretical work on the farm-to-retail 
price spread. Among the best known empirical studies of price transmission in the food 
marketing chain are Brorsen's et al. (1985) modelling of the effect of changes in output price 
risk on the marketing margin, Heien's (1980) investigation of the dynamic price adjustment by 
mark-up pricing rules, and Wohlgenant's (1985) examination of lead-lag relations between 
prices at different levels of the marketing chain. Moreover, following Ward's (1982) dynamic 
asymmetric mark-up model to study asymmetric price transmission, several studies have 
analysed the speed and the magnitude of a price transmission shock when the initial price is 
rising or falling, to establish whether price development in the food marketing chain is either 
symmetric or asymmetric (e.g. Boyd and Brorsen, 1988; Hahn, 1990; Appel, 1992). The 
common feature of these models is that they capture behaviour within static long-run 
equilibrium relationships by explaining structural relations and causes of price and margin 
determination. More recently, Bessler and Akleman (1998) have investigated vertical price 
transmission of the US pork and beef sector and examined the direction of information flows 
in linear models by using directed graphs relying on lagged relationships. 
Our work was motivated by a rather large farm-to-retail price spread in the Slovenian meat 
markets (cf. Bojnec, 1999).
1 This indicates that the Slovenian meat market during transition 
from regulated economy to a market economy are likely non-competitive markets. In spite of 
important policy relevance, to date no study examines vertical price transmission, farm-to-
retail price spread (margin), and degree of competition in the Slovenian meat market. 
Slovenia is one of the success stories among the transition countries, but agriculture and the 
food sector seem to lag behind in this general market orientation (e.g. Debatisse, 1998). It is 
important for policy design and formulation to investigate if price liberalisation and market 
deregulation during transition to a market economy is reflected in a more competitive and 
efficient price transmission. Therefore, the important objective of our article is to provide in-
depth evidence on a vertical price transmission and on a magnitude and pattern in 
development of the processing and marketing margin for the Slovenian beef and pork markets 
during the 1990s. We analyse a long-run vertical price interrelationships at farm and retail 
stages in the vertical meat chain. We use a co-integration approach to study long-run relations 
and vertical-market integration effects of two commodity markets, namely beef and pork, 
using the multivariate Johansen maximum likelihood (ML) co-integration approach (cf. also 
Jumah and Kunst, 1996; Jumah, 1996; von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998). 
                                                           
1 For a similar quality, the processing and marketing margins in the Slovenian meat market are greater than in 
more perfectly competitive markets in market economies. For example, the pork percentage margin defined as a 
percentage of margin in retail price was between 70 and 80 % in both Austria in the period 1973-1994 and in 
Slovenia in the period 1990-2000. However, in Austria, the margin is related to a greater share of more 
expensive processed products vis-à-vis in Slovenia where is the greater share of fresh meats. This clearly 
indicates that the processing and marketing margin for the similar quality of meat in Slovenia was higher than in 
Austria, which had a rather isolated and less efficient meat market during that time (Jumah, 2000).  3  
The paper is structured as follows: First, we briefly present evidence on the Slovenian beef 
and pork markets such as agricultural policies, market structure and main features of the 
sectors. Then we describe the theoretical background underlying our analysis. In the next step 
we explain the methodology used and describe our data. The chapter dealing with empirical 
analysis consists of unit root tests, a multivariate Johansen ML co-integration approach and a 
testing procedure to analyse whether markets are competitive or not. Finally, we summarise 
the main empirical results and draw our main conclusions. 
2 THE SLOVENIAN BEEF AND PORK MARKETS: AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
The Slovenian beef and pork markets have been regulated by trade measures and ad hoc price 
measures. The budgetary support has been allocated to cattle producers in less-favoured areas, 
and in 2000 the headage payments to cattle producers were introduced. 
The ad valorem tariffs and specific import levies, which have been reduced gradually 
according to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement, shield the Slovenian beef and 
pork markets from foreign competition. In 2000, the ad valorem tariffs amounted to 9% for 
beef and 10.9% for pork. The specific import levy varies by different meat cuts and processed 
meat products. For instance, according to the WTO agreement, the final bound specific import 
levy was agreed at 1,264 ECU per tone for beef carcass and at 356 ECU per tone for pork 
carcass. In the policy implementation, the specific import levies for beef and pork were often 
amounted less than the agreed ceilings in the WTO schedules. 
The closer look in price policy measures reveals changes in price formation in the period 
1990-2000. Initially, when Slovenia became independent from former Yugoslavia in 1991, 
there was a shift in price policy formation from the federal former Yugoslav institutions to the 
local Slovenian institutions. This was during the period 1990-1991 characterised by high 
market instabilities and high price volatility. With the disintegration of former Yugoslav 
markets, Slovenian beef and pork prices on the retail level as well as on the farm-gate level 
increased sharply. At the end of December 1991 and in the first quarter of 1992 the ceiling 
beef and pork prices at the farm-gate, wholesale and retail levels were set by the Slovenian 
government. The core of the price policy were ceiling parity coefficients. The ceiling parity 
coefficient between beef (1.0) and pork farm-gate prices was 0.9. The ceiling parity 
coefficient between beef farm-gate price (1.0) and beef retail price (for compensated quarter) 
was 2.5 plus 15% wholesale and retail trade margin which then determined ceiling retail 
prices of some pieces of beef by ceiling parity coefficients. The methodology for formation of 
retail pork prices was similar: the ceiling parity coefficient between the pork farm-gate price 
(1.0) and retail price of pork (warm half carcass) was 2.6 plus 15% wholesale and retail trade 
margin. Later, between the spring 1992 and the spring 1995, beef and pork farm-gate, 
wholesale, and retail prices were freely determined. The beef prices and the beef wholesale 
and retail trade margins have remained largely market determined. At the end of 2000 and the 
beginning of 2001, the government intervention in the beef market was imposed in a response 
to the BSE crisis in some the EU countries. On the contrary, there were several ad hoc price 
interventions in the fresh pork meat markets via setting the ceiling slaughtering price for pork 
half carcass and the ceiling 15% wholesale and retail trade margin for fresh pork as a basis for 
ceiling retail prices of some pieces of pork by ceiling parity coefficients.
2 The aim of ad hoc 
                                                           
2  In March 1995, the ceiling price for pork half carcass was set at 550 Slovenian tolars (SIT) in nominal prices 
per kg and it was reintroduced in July 1995. In September 1996, the ceiling price for pork half carcass was 
set at 583 SIT per kg, and it was reintroduced in January, May and September 1997, and between January 
and February 1998. The ceiling wholesale and retail trade margin was set at 15%. The ad hoc policy 
intervention continued at the end of 2000 and at the beginning of 2001.  4  
price policy in the pork market was through setting the ceiling price for fresh half pork 
carcass at the slaughtering level and ceiling wholesale and retail trade margin to regulate retail 
fresh pork prices when an up-ward tendency of fresh pork retail prices occurred. 
Cattle and pig production in Slovenia differ in the sense that most cattle is produced by a 
large number of small-scale individual farms (for example, 95 % of total cattle production in 
1997), while pig production is pursued on both small-scale individual farms (59 %) and on 
large-scale commercial farms (41 % of total pig production). Regarding the pork sector, there 
were eleven registered slaughterhouses, all of them were also engaged in cattle slaughtering. 
In comparison, there were 35 slaughterhouses for beef. As market shares indicate, cattle 
slaughtering were less concentrated than pig slaughtering. In 1997, the shares of the six 
largest pig and cattle slaughterhouses were 89 % and 48 %, respectively. Wholesale marketing 
of beef and pork is largely in the hands of slaughterhouses and meat processors. They are also 
the main exporters and importers of cattle, pigs and meats. Retail trade in beef and pork is 
rather dispersed among different kinds of retail shops and supermarkets. 
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON VERTICAL PRICE TRANSMISSION 
Similar to Cramon-Taubadel (1998) and Jumah (2000) vertical price transmission between 
farm and retail levels has been investigated within a linear model. The vertical price 
relationships at two different marketing levels in a certain meat chain is observed using three 
variables whereby the difference between a retail price (Pr) and a farm gate price (Pf) is the 
processing and marketing margin (M). The vertical price relationship can be described as: 
(1)  f r P M P + = . 
The margin (M) can generally be seen as a linear combination of a constant absolute amount 
(a) and a percentage (mark-up) amount (b) of the retail price (e.g., Tomek and Robinson, 
1995; Jumah, 2000): 
(2)   r P   b a M + = , 
with  0 a ≥  and  1 b 0 < ≤  . 
Under a situation of perfectly competitive market b equals unity (b = 0) and the margin is 
constant (M = a), which denotes a marginal cost.
3 Under a situation of market power, the meat 
processors and meat traders influence margin in such a way that it will be above marginal 
costs by charging mark-up in an amount  1 b 0 < <  of the retail price. By substituting equation 
(1) into (2) it leads to: 
(3)  f r r P P   b a P + + =  
or 










=  . 
If a market is a perfectly competitive there is no percentage mark-up in the market, i.e.  0 b = , 
and hence only a constant absolute margin remains in equation (4): 
                                                           
3  The constant (margin) is a constant multiplicative margin, which does not necessarily depend only on the 
farm component of the retail good, but may also depend on technology and other input prices. McCorriston et 
al. (2001) showed that price transmission elasticity could be greater or less than one depending on the 
offsetting influences of market structure and market power and increasing returns to scale. They listed several 
factors, which determine the extent of price transmission. Among the most important factors, which affect 
price transmission, they found characteristics of market structure by exerting market power and non-constant 
returns to scale as well as some other factors such as mark-up changes and convexity of demand shift, 
technological and cost changes.   5  
(5)   f r P P a M − = =  . 
Equation (4) can be rewritten in the reduced form as: 
(6)   f r P   b a P














If Pr and Pf are non-stationary, the tested relationship can be described as: 
(7)   t t , f t , r P   b a P ε + + =
) )  
where εt must be stationary if the above tested model is true in the long run. If the two prices 
are only linked by a constant absolute margin, then b
)





, one can assume that the margin consist of two components: an constant absolute 
amount (â) and a percentage amount (b
)
) of the retail price. In this case it can be assumed that 
intermediate traders and/or retailers charge a mark-up. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Unit root tests 
To test the number of unit roots in each time data series we applied the Augmented-Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller 1979, 1981) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips, 
1987; Phillips and Perron, 1988). Since monthly data are used seasonal unit root can occur. 
According to Schwert (1989), the ADF test is valid only for non-seasonal data and the shorter 
the time series, the more difficult it is to reject the hypothesis of non-stationary time series. 
However, Gyhsels et al. (1994) show that the usual ADF test is still valid as long as a 
sufficient number of lagged terms are included to take into account seasonal unit roots in the 
data. But they also show that the test leads to serious size distortion. So one faces a difficult 
choice either to use unadjusted data resulting in the test with the wrong size or to use adjusted 
data with adjustment procedures having adverse effects of power (Harris 1995, p. 43). The 
zero frequency unit root tests including 12 lags were used to capture seasonal structure. 
4.2 Co-integration  analysis 
Long-run vertical price relationships and reactions to deviations to the long run equilibrium in 
the Slovenian beef and pork markets are investigated using the multivariate Johansen (1988) 
ML co-integration approach, which allows testing for the presence of multiple co-integrating 
vectors and the speed of adjustment parameters. In the long run, we expect the equilibrium 
price relationships in the form of a co-integrating equilibrium relationship and a co-
integrating vector to describe the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium. Co-integration 
refers to a linear combination of two or more integrated (i.e. difference-stationary) variables, 
which implies that stochastic trends of variables are linked over time, where there is also a 
link with the current deviation from the equilibrium relationship. 
We use the vector autoregressive error correction model (VECM), which takes the following 
reduced form: 
(8)  t t k t 1 k t 1 k t 1 t ε D z ~ z ... z z + Θ + Π + ∆ Γ + + ∆ Γ = ∆ − + − −   6  
wherezt is a two-dimensional vector consisting of a retail and a farm-gate price, 
() ′ = t , j t , i t p     p   z,   k t z ~
−  is defined as  () ′ ′ = − − 1 z z ~
k t k t ,  t D  are centred seasonal dummies, 
and εt is the stochastic term ( )) niid(0,   are   εt Σ . This VECM contains information on both the 
short- and long-run adjustments to changes in zt. The estimates of  i Γ  provide the short-run 
and the estimates of Π the long-run parameters. The latter matrix can be written as 
() µ β α β
~
α Π ′ = ′ = , where α represents the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium 
and  k t z ~ β
~
− ′  is the matrix containing long-run coefficients and represents the co-integrating 
vectors. According to equation (7) the constant µ is restricted to the co-integration space and 
represents the constant absolute component of the marketing and processing margin. 
The estimation and testing procedure is the following: Estimating the number of co-
integration vectors using trace and maximal eigenvalue tests. Tests on residuals are used to 
determine the lag length of the models (according to the procedure described by Boswijk and 
Franses, 1992). Weakly exogeneity is tested to find out whether farm gate or retail prices 
adjust to the long run equilibrium after a price shock. The condition for a variable to be 
weakly exogenous for the long run parameters is that the alpha (α) vector of the weakly 
exogenous variable equals zero. If a price variable (pj,t) is found to be weakly exogenous, then 
a partial model is re-estimated: 
(9)  t t t k t k t t j t i D z z z p p ε ~ ~ ... 1 1 1 1 1 , 0 , + Θ + Π + Γ + + Γ + ∆ Γ = ∆ − + − − −  . 
It is worth mentioning that the Π ~  does not contain any information on the factor loadings α 
of the weakly exogenous variable pj,t. The re-estimation of equation (8) as partial model 
shown in equation (9), i.e. conditioning on weakly exogenous variables, is very likely to lead 
to improved statistical properties of the model (Johansen, 1992). 
To test whether beef and pork markets are competitive, we carried out structural tests, i.e. 
imposing restrictions on the β
~
 vector. A market is considered to be competitive, if the long 
run coefficients of retail and farm gate prices are equal in absolute terms but with opposite 
signs. This means that we impose the following homogeneity constraint: 
(10) 
j i p p 0 β β : H − =  . 
The restricted co-integration vector  * β
~
 = Hϕ is defined as: 
















− = ϕ =  
where H is the matrix containing homogeneity restrictions and unrestricted parameters and ϕ 
is a matrix with unknown parameters. Linear restrictions are tested using a likelihood ratio 
test. 
The co-integration analysis and testing procedures are carried out by use of CATS (Hansen 
and Juselius, 1995) a program that runs in RATS.  
5 DATA 
Due to problems constructing data series of higher frequency (e.g. weakly) for Slovenia, 
farm-gate and retail beef and pork prices used in this analysis are monthly observations 
(January 1990 to August 2000). Farm-gate prices are represented by average purchase prices  7  
in Slovene tolars (SIT) per kg of slaughter weight for beef (BF) and pork (PF), while a 
comparable set of retail prices of beef (BR) and pork (PR) is constructed from prices for meat 
cuts.
4 Data on nominal prices are deflated using the Slovenian monthly consumer price index 
(CPI) with the base period in January 1990 to obtain a series of real prices. From this point 
onwards, whenever the word price is used in the paper, it means real prices. The deflation 
procedure does not cause changes in the farm-to-retail price ratio, and neither does it result in 
a different price transmission model.
5 Therefore, we assume the absence of money illusion 
(see e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), i.e. inflation does not affect relative price structures. 
The source of the monthly price and CPI data is the Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia (SORS). 
Price data analysis showed erratic price movements in the years 1991-1992 (Figure 1). The 
retail pork prices per kg are higher than the retail beef prices, while the farm-gate beef prices 
are higher than the farm-gate pork prices.
6 Consequently, the processing and marketing 
margin in the pork market is greater than in the beef market. Lower farm-gate prices for pork 
compared to beef can be explained by supply side factors, especially better cost efficiency in 
the conversion of feed into pork than into beef. Higher pork retail prices compared to beef 
retail prices can be explained by demand side factors, especially consumer preference for pork 
in contrast to beef.
7 In general the farm-gate beef and pork prices are more stable than the 
retail beef and pork prices. The period 1990-1992 includes a shock which followed the 
secession from the former Yugoslavia, when farm-gate beef and pork prices and retail beef 
and pork prices sharply increased. Whereas price instability in the pork market was much 
lower in the period 1994-2000 than in the period 1990-1993, instability at the retail and 
producer levels in the beef market did not change substantially. 
                                                           
4  The average slaughter conversion factor of a 0.54 for beef and 0.72 for pork were used when converting 
farm-gate prices from a live weight in a slaughter weight. The retail price of beef (BR) is constructed as the 
arithmetic average of retail prices for ”young boned beef” and ”young unboned beef”. Therefore, our retail 
beef price consists of only of fresh meats. The retail price for pork (PR) is constructed as the weighted 
average of retail prices of ”boned pork” (weighted by 0.45), ”pork without bones” (0.4), ”ham, no fat no 
skin” (0.05), ”smoked bacon” (0.05) and ”rolled ham” (0.05). Note that beef and pork are sold in a wide 
variety of products at the retail level. This is important to note for cross-country and across market 
comparisons. 
5  It is assumed that inflation transmission through the price structure and thus its effect on relative intra-market 
and inter-market price volatility is equal to zero (i.e. inflation does not distort price structure). Loy and 
Weaver (1998) modelled the relationship between inflation and relative price volatility for Russian food 
prices during a time of high inflation and hyperinflation. The anticipated - and to a lesser extent unanticipated 
- rates of inflation were found to cause price volatility by induced changes in the relative price structure as a 
result of sticky prices, which differentially transmit inflation between products within a particular market and 
across markets. However, during the period 1993-2000 the inflation rate in Slovenia was much lower than in 
Russia, as the annual inflation rate was reduced substantially from 32.3% in 1993, to 19.8% in 1994, to 
12.6% in 1995 and to below 10% afterwards. 
6  This holds also when only fresh beef and pork prices at the retail level are considered. 
7  According to the Slovenian meat market balances, per capita pork consumption was at least 50 percent 
greater than beef consumption during the 1990s. Between 1992 and 1999, annual per capita meat 
consumption increased from 77.8 kg in 1992 to 92.3 kg in 1999. The annual per capita beef consumption 
increased from 22.6 kg in 1992 to 28.3 kg in 1993, but a steady declined afterwards to 22.1 kg in 1999. The 
annual per capita pork consumption increased from 32.2 kg in 1992 to 41.5 kg in 1999. In 1992, beef (29.1%) 
and pork (41.4%) represented 70.5% of meat consumption. The share of other meats was 29.5% (22% 
poultry, 0.2% sheep and goats, 1.3% horse meat, and 6% meat of offal). In 1999, the structure of meat 
consumption in Slovenia was the following: 69% beef (24%) and pork (45%), and 31% other meats (26.1% 
poultry, 0.6% sheep and goats, 0.3% horse meat, and 4% meat of offal) (AIS, 2000).  8  




Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 
 
The slightly lower volatility of the pork margin could indicate more long-term arrangements 
throughout the pork chain. Higher stability of the farm-gate pork prices after 1993 could be 
explained by a rather high market share of pigs on large-scale commercial farms, which are 











































Retail price  9  
delivery of pigs at rather stable prices. Finally, this difference could also be due to differences 
in government trade and intervention policies, and due to an increase in the volatility of beef 
retail and farm-gate prices in response to the BSE crisis in some the EU countries. 
6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the results of the unit root test, co-integration analysis, weak exogeneity and 
structural test are presented. 
Since the period 1990-93 was influenced by strong shocks, we analysed two periods.
8 First, 
we estimated the long run price transmission for the total period 1990:1-2000:8 and in a 
second step, data of the first four years were omitted to avoid that the models are strongly 
influenced by high volatility in the years 1990-1993. Therefore, we additionally estimated 
beef and pork models for the period 1994-2000. 
Thus, we started with investigating the order in which the four price series are individually 
integrated. With applying zero frequency ADF unit root tests including 12 lags and the PP test 
with four truncation lags to the 1990-2000 series we found - on a 0.90 significance level - that 
(using unit root tests with trend) 7 out of 8 tests indicate the time series to be trend stationary 
(Table 1). On a 0.95 significance level the two farm-gate prices are seen as I(0), i.e. trend-
stationary variables.  
Table 1.  Results of unit root tests 1990-2000 
Tests  BR BF PR PF 
ADF test with trend  -2.82* -1.60  -3.19* -3.32* 
ADF test with constant  -2.38 -0.62 -1.54 -1.39 
PP test with trend  -3.17* -3.47**  -2.86  -3.63** 
PP test with constant  -3.13** -2.78*  -2.30  -2.50 
*,** denote a 0.90 and 0.95 significance level, respectively. 
Note:  To capture seasonal structure the models include 12 additional lags in Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test. For the Phillips-Perron (PP) test we applied the Newey-West correction (4 truncation lags). Based on 
Fuller (1976) critical values on a 0.95 (0.90) significance level for ADF and PP tests with trend are -3.45 
(-3.15) and for ADF and PP tests with constant are -2.89 (-2.58). 
 
Applying the same tests to the period 1994-2000 all price series are found to be stationary on 
a 0.95 significance level (Table 2). Only the series PF is found to be trend-stationary on a 0.90 
significance level. Based on this results all four series in the period 1994-2000 are considered 
as I(1) variables. 
                                                           
8 We started our analysis with the 1990-2000 period as a whole to empirically clarify whether and how market 
intervention and break away from traditional markets cause the result? It was revealed that the result is biased 
due to government intervention in the initial period. So the results for the second subperiod 1994-2000 are 
presented in more detail, while the result for the 1990-2000 period as a whole is only provided for a certain 
comparison.  10 
Table 2.  Results of unit root tests 1994-2000 
Tests  BR BF PR PF 
ADF test with trend  -1.76 -2.15 -1.53 -3.42* 
ADF test with constant  -0.54 -0.91 -1.66 -2.07 
PP test with trend  -2.80 -2.79 -1.73 -2.06 
PP test with constant  -1.41 -0.80 -1.71 -1.76 
* denotes a 0.90 significance level. 
Note:  To capture seasonal structure the models include 12 additional lags in Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test. For the Phillips-Perron (PP) test we applied the Newey-West correction (3 truncation lags). Based on 
Fuller (1976) critical values on a 0.95 (0.90) significance level for ADF and PP tests with trend are -3.45 
(-3.15) and for ADF and PP tests with constant are -2.89 (-2.58). 
 
Since there is a near equivalence between trend-stationary and difference-stationary processes 
it is difficult to distinguish between them in finite samples. A crucial problem in applying unit 
root tests is their tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis when it is true (poor size 
property) and to under-reject when it is false (poor power property). Thus, it is not possible to 
state that a variable is stationary or non-stationary, but to state that a certain finite sample 
exhibits stationary or non-stationary attributes (Harris 1995, p. 47). This was the reason we 
also applied co-integration analysis to the 1990-2000 period, although the unit root tests for 
that period suggested most of the variables to be trend-stationary. 
The relative number of agents between pork and beef markets do not necessarily imply a 
stronger probability of finding price transmission in the market with a higher number of 
agents (the beef market in our case). Namely, price transmission can be influenced by some 
other factors such as government policies, bargaining and different contractual arrangements. 
To test vertical price transmission in the beef and pork chains, respectively, the co-integration 
analysis is carried out within the same vertical meat market chain (i.e., separately for beef and 
for pork) evaluating the size and relationship between farm-gate price on one side and retail-
price on the other. 
Results of the co-integration analysis are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Based on the trace 
statistics, the results of the rank (r) test indicate one co-integrating vector in the beef market in 
both periods 1990-2000 and 1994-2000 and one in the pork market in the period 1994-2000. 
In the 1990-2000 pork model no co-integration relationship was found. The test for the unit 
roots within the multivariate Johansen ML approach suggest that all data series used in our 
models with one co-integrating vector are non-stationary. This holds also for the beef price 
series in the 1990-2000 model. 
As can be seen from the test results on the residuals the model selection was mainly based on 
two out of four tests applied.
9 The co-integration vector is presented in a normalised form, in 
such a way that the first element (retail price BR) of the vector β
~′ is set equal to unity. The 
coefficients of BF and the constant are presented in column 5 and 6 in Table 3. 
                                                           
9  The models can potentially be improved implementing other unobserved input variables influencing the 
processing and marketing margin such as labour or energy costs. But these data were not available at the time 
of calculation.  11 
Table 3.  Results of co-integration analysis
10 
          Normalised  Tests on the residuals 
Model 














1990-2000  11 No 23.51 
3.79 
** 
-1.403 -17.532  0.10  0.73  0.03  0.00 
BR-BF 
1994-2000  10 No 25.63 
3.25 
*** 
-1.541 -15.933  0.00  0.55  0.77  0.02 
BR-BF
a 
1994-2000  10 No  -    -1.547 -15.868  0.37  0.61  0.77  0.49 
PR-PF 
1990-2000  No co-integration 
PR-PF 
1994-2000  12 Yes 22.20 
6.61 
**  -1.234 -58.985  0.00  0.26  0.67  0.00 
PR-PF
a 
1994-2000  12 Yes  -    -1.120 -61.154  0.00  0.49  0.76  0.00 
**,*** denote a 0.95 and 0.99 significance level (trace statistics), respectively. 
a Partial model. 
Note:  The beef model is estimated for the periods 1990:1-2000:8 and 1994:1-2000:8, respectively. The pork 
model is estimated for the periods 1991:1-2008:8 and 1994:8-2000:8, respectively. 
Table 4 presents the α parameters for the speed of adjustment of retail and farm-gate prices to 
the long-run equilibrium. Except in the case of DPF, the α parameter is of the negative sign. 
As can be seen from the α parameter, retail prices reacted more intensively to unanticipated 
shocks than farm-gate prices. The responses in the beef market were faster than in the pork 
market. The greatest magnitude in the α parameter is found in the case of DBR. It ranged 
between –0.360 and –0.634 suggesting the intensive and significant adjustment in retail beef 
price to unanticipated shocks away from the long-run equilibrium. The α parameter associated 
with farm-gate prices are less than with retail prices. Except for the DBF in the 1990-2000 
model, the α parameters associated with farm-gate prices were not found as statistically 
significant. 
Table 4.  Factor loading matrix 
Model Variable  α  t value 
DBR -0.371  -4.610  Beef, 1990-2000  DBF -0.094  -2.826 
DBR -0.634  -5.012 
Beef, 1994-2000  DBF -0.039  -0.515 
Beef, 1994-2000 
a DBR  -0.360  -5.105 
DPR -0.217  -3.320 
Pork, 1994-2000, seasonal dummies  DPF 0.035  0.987 
Pork, 1994-2000, seasonal dummies
 a DPR  -0.246  -4.126 
a Partial model. 
Note:  The beef model is estimated for the periods 1990:1-2000:8 and 1994:1-2000:8, respectively. The pork 
model is estimated for the periods 1991:1-2008:8 and 1994:8-2000:8, respectively. 
 
                                                           
10  Table reports only the trace test since it shows more robustness to skewness and excess kurtosis in the 
residuals than the maximal eigenvalue test (Cheung and Lai, 1993).  12 
Based on the estimated coefficients in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 the long run price 
relationship (ECT) for beef (1990-2000) can be formulated as: 
(12)  ECT = BR - 17.532 - 1.403 * BF . 
As illustrated in equation (12) we cannot determine whether beef price changes were mainly 
induced by demand or supply side factors (see Table 5). For pork, we did not find any co-
integration vector in the period 1990-2000. This suggests an absence of long run price 
relationship between retail and farm gate price level during the 1990-2000 period as a whole. 
The results of the weak exogeneity tests (Table 5) indicate that in the 1994-2000 models the 
farm-gate prices (BF and PF) are weakly exogenous and the retail prices (BR and PR) react to 
changes in the farm-gate prices. This means that the price changes were mainly induced by 
producer side factors as only BR and PR respond to deviations from the long run equilibrium. 
Due to this, these models were re-estimated as partial models where the farm gate price 
entered the model as weakly exogenous variable.
11 
The long run price relation between retail and farm gate prices for the period 1994-2000 can 
be described as: 
(13)  BR = 15.868 + 1.547 * BF  
(14)  PR = 61.154 + 1.120 * PF . 
 
Table 5  Test results for weak exogeneity 
Model Variable  Test  LR  statistics  p-value 
BR  αBR = 0  χ
2(1) = 15.78  0.00  Beef, 1990-2000 
BF  αBF = 0  χ
2(1) = 6.30  0.01 
BR  αBR = 0  χ
2(1) = 18.37  0.00  Beef, 1994-2000  BF  αBF = 0  χ
2(1) = 0.23  0.63 
PR  αPR = 0  χ
2(1) = 5.95  0.01  Pork, 1994-2000  PF  αPF = 0  χ
2(1) = 0.58  0.44 
Note:  The beef model is estimated for the periods 1990:1-2000:8 and 1994:1-2000:8, respectively. The pork 
model is estimated for the period 1991:1-2008:8 and 1994:8-2000:8, respectively. 
 
To test whether markets are competitive or non-competitive structural tests have been carried 
out. Results are presented in Table 6. As can be seen only in the case of the 1994-2000 pork 
model the restricted model is not significantly different from the unrestricted model. This 
means that the margin in the pork model is a constant absolute margin, while the margin in 
the beef market is a mixture between a constant and a percentage margin. The short 1994-
2000 pork model depicts a competitive market while the long 1990-2000 beef model and the 
short 1994-2000 beef model are identified as a market where additional mark-ups are charged. 
 
                                                           
11  As can be seen in Table 3 estimating a partial model usually improves the stochastic properties of the model.  13 
Table 6.  Results of the structural test 
Coefficients  Statistics 
Model Test 
i p β  
j p β   constant  LR p-value 
Beef, 1990-2000  β
~
β
~* =   1 -1  -31.786  χ
2(1) = 3.89  0.05 
Beef, 1994-2000  β
~
β
~* =   1 -1  -30.780  χ
2(1) = 10.93  0.00 
Pork, 1994-2000  β
~
β
~* =   1 -1  -63.279  χ
2(1) = 0.34  0.56 
Note:  The beef model is estimated for the periods 1990:1-2000:8 and 1994:1-2000:8, respectively. The pork 
model is estimated for the periods 1991:1-2008:8 and 1994:8-2000:8, respectively. 
 
Price transmission in the beef sector in the period 1990-2000 and long run margin equation 
can be described as: 







  ⇒  287 . 0 b =  





= )   ⇒  496 . 12 a =  
(17) BR * 0.287 12.496 MarginBeef + =  , 
which clearly indicates the mark-up processing and marketing margin in the beef sector. 
Price transmission in the beef sector in the period 1994-2000 and long run margin equation 
can be described as: 







  ⇒  354 . 0 b =  





= )   ⇒  257 . 10 a =  
(20) BR * 354 . 0 257 . 10 MarginBeef + = , 
which clearly reveals the mark-up processing and marketing margin in the beef sector. 
Price transmission in the pork sector in the period 1994-2000 and long run margin equation 
can be described as: 
(21) 63.279 MarginPork =  
(22)  PF 63.279 PR + = , 
which indicates a competitive processing and marketing margin in the pork sector. 
7 CONCLUSION 
One of the most striking finding of our analysis is that protected and regulated/controlled 
markets may perform as competitive markets, but it is less likely to be an efficient market in 
terms of the size of the margin. This is revealed by a greater processing and marketing margin 
for a provided similar quality of marketing service than in more perfectly competitive markets 
in market economies. The processing and marketing margin in the Slovenian pork market is 
greater than in the beef market owing to the higher retail pork price compared to the lower  14 
retail beef price on the one side, and due to the lower farm-gate pork price compared to the 
higher farm-gate beef price. The decline of the processing and marketing margin in the pork 
market indicates an adjustment to more competitive markets. 
The results of the vertical price transmission using the multivariate Johansen ML co-
integration approach suggest, except for the 1990-2000 pork model, a long-run price 
relationship in both the beef and pork markets. Co-integration results indicate that there is a 
long-run vertical price transmission between the farm-gate beef and the retail beef prices in 
the analysed period 1990-2000 as a whole and also in the pork market in the period 1994-
2000. The results of the weak exogeneity tests in the period 1994-2000 identify the farm-gate 
beef and pork prices as weakly exogenous, while the retail beef and pork prices react to 
changes in the farm-gate beef and pork prices. Therefore, one could assume that efficiency 
improvements and lower costs arising from producer side factors were crucial for the retail 
price changes in the Slovenian meat market. 
The structural test imposing the restrictions implied by competition indicates that processors 
and traders in the beef market charged a mark-up of the retail price for beef plus an absolute 
constant margin. This indicates the existence of market power in the beef processing and 
marketing in the long-run. For pork, the empirical results indicate that even in an isolated and 
ad hoc regulated market the processors and traders charged a constant absolute margin 
suggesting absence of market power and competitive processing and marketing margin 
formation. This more smooth input price and margin transmission in the pork processing and 
marketing chain seem to be due to the rather vertically integrated pork market in Slovenia. 
Contractual arrangements between farms and slaughterhouses seem to work better in the pork 
market, where large-scale commercial farms are the main supplier of pigs, while small-scale 
farms predominantly produce pork for home consumption. Small-scale farms mainly produce 
cattle, and unlike pork, most of it is marketed to the slaughterhouses. As the processing and 
marketing margins in the Slovenian meat markets are still much greater than in market 
economies, further adjustments and restructuring towards more competitive markets are 
expected with trade liberalisation and meat processing and marketing deregulation. 
Our co-integration results clearly suggest that even in a situation of an externally isolated and 
internally regulated meat markets, as it was the case in Slovenia during the 1990s, the meat 
market may behave like a competitive market. However, it is less likely that the existent 
market structures and equilibrium situations which occurred within protectionist trade policies 
and policy induced transfers prevail in the future. As in some other Central and East European 
countries (e.g. Hungary and Poland), functioning agricultural and food markets have 
developed quickly, but further reforms, restructuring, quality and cost efficient measures to 
reduce farm, processing and marketing inefficiencies in the beef and pork meat chains are 
required.  15 
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